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Ending the “Doc Fix”: How Repealing the 
Sustainable Growth Rate Could Give Medicare 
Beneficiaries Better Access to Primary Care 
Through Accountable Care Organizations 
Alisha Trotter* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Medicare into law in 19651 
he stated, “No longer will older Americans be denied the healing miracle of 
modern medicine. No longer will illness crush and destroy the savings they 
have so carefully put away over a lifetime so that they might enjoy dignity 
in their later years.”2 
Prior to Medicare, only about 55 percent of senior citizens in the United 
States had health insurance.3 This low number was largely attributed to 
seniors having retired and not being eligible to receive care from their 
employers.4 Before the 1930s, people primarily paid for health care out of 
                                                                                                                              
* Alisha Trotter is a 2014 JD Candidate at Seattle University School of Law.  She was 
inspired to write this piece after volunteering at low-income clinics and seeing multiple 
disparities within the health care system. Alisha hopes that her article will influence 
individuals within health care systems to think of innovative ways to efficiently deliver 
high quality care while being cost effective. Alisha would like to thank her friends and 
family for their continued and unyielding support, Dean Annette Clark of Seattle 
University School of Law for helping her develop her article, and Becca Rausch for 
helping her brainstorm ideas for this article.  Finally, Alisha would like to thank the staff 
of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice for their hard work and help in improving this 
article. 
1 Social Security, Health Insurance for Aged and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) (1965). 
2 HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEDICARE 2000: 35 YEARS OF IMPROVING AMERICANS’ 
HEALTH AND SECURITY, 2 (2000), available at http://media.jsonline.com/documents/M 
edicare2000.pdf. 
3 See Tom Dowdal, Medicare from the Start to Today, NATIONAL BIPARTISAN 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE, http://rs9.loc.gov/medicare/history.htm. 
4 See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs: Historical 
Development and Choices for the 1990s, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 148 (1993). 
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their own pockets.5 If they could not afford the service or the medicine they 
would either not obtain it, or they “paid” for it by sacrificing their financial 
health. In the 1930s, the “Blues” plans were the true beginnings of health 
insurance as we know it.6 Instead of paying out of pocket, the “Blues” plans 
provided pre-paid hospital care and began providing reimbursement for 
physician services.7 Like modern insurance, the “Blues” plans covered in-
hospital surgical care as well as medical services.8 The “Blues” policies 
were organized by hospital associations at the state level and offered private 
coverage for hospital care.9 Under these plans, anyone could sign up, and 
premiums were based on a community rating, which meant everyone paid 
the same rate regardless of age, health status, or claims history.10 Once the 
plans proved to be viable, ordinary insurers,11 or “commercial” companies, 
began to cover medical bills and used underwriting to assess insurability 
and set premiums.12 Under both the “Blues” plans and commercial policies, 
payments were made retroactively to providers on a fee-for-service basis for 
virtually all services deemed medically necessary.13 When providers are 
paid on a fee-for-service basis it means that they are paid for each service 
performed.14 
                                                                                                                              
5 Id. at 142. 
6 Id. at 143. 
7 Marc Lichtenstein, Health Insurance from Invention to Innovation: A History of the 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Companies, BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD (Nov. 12, 
2012), http://www.bcbs.com/blog/health-insurance.html. 
8 Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 141–42. 
9 Id.; Healthcare Crisis History, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/healthcarecrisis/history.htm 
(last visited July 1, 2013). 
10 Bovbjerg et al., supra note 5, at 141, 143; See Glossary: Community Rating, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/community-rating/ (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2013). 
11 It was mainly life insurance companies that began adopting these practices. Bovbjerg 
et al., supra note 4, at 141, 143. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 143.  
14 Glossary, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/f/fee.html (last 
visited July 1, 2013). 
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These early “Blues” plans, followed by the commercial plans, set the 
pattern for health coverage that still dominates US health financing.15 
However, during that earlier era, cost problems did not exist because 
benefits and payments were at low levels, few people had coverage, and 
medical technology did not exist to provide sophisticated care.16 But during 
the 1940s and 1950s, the beginnings of price increases were becoming 
visible as the proportion of the population with health insurance grew 
rapidly.17 In an effort to compete for workers, employers began providing 
private health insurance as a fringe benefit to employees, making the cost of 
health care less prohibitive.18 Despite the expansion of private health 
insurance, many seniors19 were excluded because they were retired and did 
not receive health insurance coverage from an employer.20 While the federal 
government supplied some health services, it was only to identifiable 
“federal” populations like the armed services, veterans, and the Indian 
Health Service (operated on reservations)21 which left the poor, the frail, 
and the aged to fend for themselves.22 President Johnson’s remarks when he 
signed the Medicare Bill23 embodies the vision behind Medicare: expand 
                                                                                                                              
15 Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 141, 143.  The Pierce County Medical Bureau, which 
was a pioneer program in Tacoma, Washington now known as Regence BlueShield, 
provided the basis for Blues plans existing today. Who We Are, HEALTH CARE SERV. 
CORP., http://www.hcsc.com/who_we_are.html (last visited July 1, 2013). 
16 Bovbjerg et al., supra note 4, at 141, 143. 
17 Id. at 141, 145, 148. Health plans began to offer broader coverage of services and 
higher limits on dollars payable to compensate for medical care becoming more 
expensive and elaborate. Id. at 146. Many more medications were available to treat a 
range of diseases, which included new vaccines. PBS, supra note 10. Tax subsidies were 
also helping to extend health insurance to much of the middle class, and in response to 
the increase in those who had insurance, the federal Hill-Burton Act made available 
grants to expand and modernize hospital capacity. Id. at 141, 145–46. 
18 Id. at 145; PBS, supra note 9. 
19 “Those within the Social Security system and past retirement age.”  Bovbjerg et al., 
supra note 4, at 148. 
20 See id. 
21 Id. at 145. 
22 See id. at 148. 
23 See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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high quality medical care to seniors and provide financial protection against 
the frequent and sometimes devastating cost of illness.24 
Today, Medicare primarily serves as the nation’s health insurance for 
elderly citizens ages 65 and older.25 Because many seniors are retired, they 
live on a fixed income and dwindling savings.26 By providing health 
insurance to seniors, Medicare has helped to reduce poverty as well as 
increase life expectancy among the elderly.27 However, Medicare as it was 
originally conceptualized is no longer providing adequate health care 
coverage for seniors because it is becoming increasingly difficult for seniors 
to obtain primary care. Because Medicare reimburses primary care 
physicians at a low rate for the medical services they provide, primary care 
physicians are unable to afford to treat Medicare patients.28 Many 
physicians must consider expenses such as business loans, overhead, and 
malpractice insurance when deciding if they can afford to accept Medicare 
beneficiaries, and many are finding that they cannot afford to run their 
businesses.29 This in turn makes it harder for Medicare beneficiaries to find 
primary care physicians.30 An American Medical Association survey found 
that overall, 17 percent of physicians restricted the number of Medicare 
                                                                                                                              
24 HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., supra  note 2, at 4. 
25 CENTER FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, WHAT IS MEDICARE? 1 (Sept. 
2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11306.pdf .  Medicare also serves 
people who are permanently disabled with end stage renal disease. Id. 
26 See HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., supra note 2, at 2. 
27 Id. at 33. 
28 See MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 91 (2012), 
available at http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/Mar12_Ch04_CORRECTED.pdf; AM. 
MED. ASS’N, AMA ONLINE SURVEY OF PHYSICIANS: THE IMPACT OF MEDICARE 
PHYSICIAN PAYMENT ON SENIORS ACCESS TO CARE (2010), available at 
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/outlook/documents/medicare_survey_results_06
1810.pdf. 
29 See Steve Daniels, Doctors Who Take Medicare Scarce, ABC EYEWITNESS NEWS 
(May 10, 2012), http://abclocal.go.com/wtvd/story?section=news/abc11_investigates&id 
=8656615. 
30 See MEDPAC, supra note 28, at 91. 
Ending the "Doc Fix" 251 
VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 1 • 2013 
patients in their practice.31 The top two reasons for this are because 
Medicare payment rates are too low and the ongoing threat of future 
payment cuts makes Medicare an unreliable payer.32 These threats are 
especially concerning for primary care physicians, whom the survey found 
made up 31 percent, or approximately one third, of physicians who restrict 
the number of Medicare patients.33 
This is particularly problematic when considering the role of primary 
care physicians and their potential for reducing health care costs. Primary 
care is associated with prevention of illness and death, as well as 
improvement in equitable distribution of health care services.34 An 
increasing body of literature shows that primary care physicians are 
associated with longer life expectancy and higher patient health ratings as 
compared with physicians who specialize in a particular area of medicine.35 
Because of the preventative nature of primary care physicians, the ability to 
see one regularly is key to reducing patient costs because healthier patients 
have fewer complications, thus reducing the need to spend an exorbitant 
amount on health care.36 Although specialists are often best qualified to 
provide care within their areas of expertise for patients with more advanced 
clinical conditions, primary care physicians have been shown to deliver care 
similar in quality to that of specialists for certain conditions, such as 
diabetes and hypertension, while using fewer resources.37 While many 
Medicare patients seek specialists for their ailments, the need for primary 
                                                                                                                              
31 AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 28. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Glen Cheng, The National Residency Exchange: A Proposal to Restore Primary Care 
in an Age of Microspecialization, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 158, 163 (2012). 
35 Id. 
36 See Margaret Ann Cross, Spend Money on Healthy People, MANAGED CARE (2004), 
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0408/0408.wellpeople.html. 
37 M. RENEE ZEREHI, AM. COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS, HOW IS A SHORTAGE OF PRIMARY 
CARE PHYSICIANS AFFECTING THE QUALITY AND COST OF MEDICAL CARE?: A 
COMPREHENSIVE EVIDENCE REVIEW 5 (2008), available at http://www.acponline.org/ 
advocacy/where_we_stand/policy/primary_shortage.pdf. 
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care physicians in the Medicare arena is arguably more significant in 
improving health outcomes, disease prevention, cost effectiveness, and 
coordination of care.38 
Care coordination is a function that supports information sharing across 
providers, patients, types and levels of service, sites, and time frames.39 The 
goal of care coordination is to ensure that patients’ needs and preferences 
are achieved, and that care is efficient and of high quality.40 Care 
coordination is most needed by persons who have multiple ailments that 
cannot be met by a single clinician or clinical organization.41 These 
individuals’ conditions are ongoing, the severity of which being subject to 
change over time.42 An evidence review by the American College of 
Physicians43 found that an increase in one primary care physician per 
10,000 people in a state was associated with a reduction in overall spending 
of $684 per Medicare beneficiary.44 By comparison, an increase of one 
specialist per 10,000 people was estimated to result in an increase in overall 
spending of $526 per Medicare beneficiary.45 
The value of primary care manifests itself in lower costs as a result of 
reduced hospitalization, improved prevention, and better coordination of 
                                                                                                                              
38 See Cheng, supra note 34, at 162–63. 
39 SARAH HUDSON SCHOLLE, NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, 





43 The American College of Physicians (ACP) is a national organization of internists 
(physician specialists) who apply scientific knowledge and clinical expertise to the 
diagnosis, treatment, and compassionate care of adults across the spectrum from health to 
complex illness. About ACP: Who We Are, AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, 
http://www.acponline.org/about_acp/who_we_are/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2013). ACP is 
the largest medical-specialty organization and the second largest physician led group in 
the U.S. Id. 
44 Id. at 5. 
45 Id. 
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chronic disease care.46 The importance of access to primary care physicians 
is echoed in the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission’s (MedPAC)47 
report to Congress, which found that Medicare beneficiaries looking for 
primary care physicians had greater difficulty during the two preceding 
years.48 MedPAC’s concern is reasonable considering there were 47.5 
million people enrolled in Medicare in 2010,49 and by 2030 more than 80 
million people will be on Medicare due to retiring baby boomers.50 The 
potential for primary care to reduce health care costs should be at the 
forefront of health care policy, especially when Medicare spent $549 billion 
for items and services in 2011,51 and that amount is likely to increase with 
the amount of people projected to be on Medicare. 
With the ever-increasing cost of health care, this prospect has fiscal 
experts concerned about how Medicare will support all of its beneficiaries.52 
These statistics and estimates have forced the government to reexamine its 
                                                                                                                              
46 David Kinsman & Jacquelyn Blaser, Primary Care Provides Patients with Better 
Outcomes at Lower Cost, Urgent Need to Prevent Shortages of Primary Care Physicians, 
AM. COL. OF PHYSICIANS, http://www.acponline.org/pressroom/primary_shortage.htm 
(last visited July 2, 2013). 
47 MedPac is a 17 member independent Congressional agency that advises the U.S. 
Congress on issues affecting the Medicare program. In addition to advising Congress on 
payments to private health plans participating in Medicare and providers in Medicare’s 
traditional fee for service program, MedPAC is also tasked with analyzing access to care, 
quality of care, and other issues affecting Medicare. The Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission, About MedPac, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/about.cfm (last visited 
July 2, 2013). 
48 MEDPAC, supra note 28, at 91. 
49 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (2012), 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0146.pdf. 
50 MEDPAC, CONTEXT FOR MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 3–4 (2008), available at 
http://www.medpac.gov/chapters/Mar08_ch01.pdf. See NY TIMES, Medicare, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/medicare/in
dex.html (last visited July 1, 2013). 
51 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Trustees Report & Trust Fund (Apr. 23, 
2012, 1:07 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/index.html?redirect=/reportstrustfunds/. 
52 See David M. Herszenhorn, For Many House Democrats, Cost Is the Concern, NY 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, available at http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/for-
many-house-democrats-cost-is-the-concern/. See also supra note 50. 
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approach to health care financing through the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA).53 Signed into law by President Barack Obama 
in 2010,54 the ACA proposed Accountable Care Organizations under the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program to address the current problems with 
Medicare.55 Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are groups of health 
care professionals responsible for the overall care of patients who have 
original Medicare (those not in a Medicare Advantage private plan).56 
Providers aim to coordinate care for patients and manage chronic disease 
with the goal of achieving health care quality goals and outcomes that result 
in cost savings.57 Providers who voluntarily meet certain quality criteria are 
eligible to share in the cost savings they achieve for the Medicare 
program.58 
Because ACOs are a shift toward a payment mechanism that emphasizes 
quality over volume, they have the potential to serve as a platform for 
encouraging primary care providers to continue accepting Medicare 
beneficiaries. The problem of primary care physicians not accepting 
Medicare patients can be largely attributed to the sustainable growth rate 
(SGR).59  The SGR is a component of the formula used to calculate 
                                                                                                                              
53 See STAFF OF THE WASH. POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW 
HEALTH CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 113 (1st ed. 2010) [hereinafter 
LANDMARK]. 
54 HEALTH CARE REFORM: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS, 2012 1 (Barry R. Furrow et 
al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Furrow et al.]. 
55 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §§ 10, 307, 
3022, 124 Stat. 119, 395, 940 (2010) (amending title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395  (2006), by adding § 1899, “Shared Savings Program”); Section 3022; 
Furrow et. al, supra note 54, at 210. 
56 Shining a Light on Health Insurance Rate Increases, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., (Dec. 29, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-
and-FAQs/ratereview.html. 
57 Glossary: Accountable Care Organization, HEALTHCARE.GOV, available at 
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/accountable-care-organization/. 
58 Furrow et al., supra note 54, at 211. 
59 ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ & JOE HECK, MEDICARE PHYSICIAN PAYMENT INNOVATION 
ACT OF 2012 1, available at http://heck.house.gov/sites/heck.house.gov/files/Medicare 
%20Physician%20Payment%20Innovation%20Act%20Framework.pdf. 
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physician payments for providing services to Medicare beneficiaries60 and 
contributes to lower reimbursement rates.61 Lower reimbursements are a 
result of Medicare expenditures exceeding the SGR formula’s statutory 
target.62 If spending exceeds the cumulative spending target for Medicare 
expenditures over a certain period, future updates are reduced to bring 
spending back in line with the target. Although this article will mostly 
discuss the SGR as it affects traditional Medicare, I will also be discussing 
the effects of the formula on Medicare Advantage because it affects 27 
percent of Medicare beneficiaries (13.1 million individuals) whom are 
enrolled in a plan.63  
In this article, I propose that repealing the SGR would provide a platform 
for ACOs to be implemented as an alternative payment method for 
traditional Medicare, and in turn encourage primary care physicians to 
continue accepting Medicare beneficiaries. If achieved, primary care 
providers would not continually be subject to the drastic payment cuts 
caused by the SGR and would be rewarded by sharing in the cost-savings 
primary care providers achieve for their role in practicing preventative care 
methods. First, I will discuss how Medicare has historically operated; 
second, I will discuss the different ways Medicare has tried to control costs 
through various payment methods; third, I will describe the characteristics 
of ACOs and why they could be used to encourage providers to continue 
accepting Medicare beneficiaries; and fourth, I will examine the skepticism 
surrounding ACOs. 
                                                                                                                              
60 AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICARE AND THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE 6, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/mss/cola_medicare_pres.pdf. 
61 See SCHWARTZ & HECK, supra note 59, at 1. 
62 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICARE PHYSICIAN PAYMENT UPDATES AND THE 
SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE SYSTEM (2006), available at http://www.ascrs.org/down 
load/gov/Medicare%20Physician%20Payment%20Updates%20and%20the%20Sustainab
le%20Growth%20Rate%20SGR%20System.pdf. 
63 THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE FACT SHEET, (Nov. 
30, 2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/2052-16.pdf. 
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II. MEDICARE 101 
A. The Logistics 
Managed by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),64 
Medicare is divided into four parts: Part A covers hospital insurance; Part B 
is supplemental medical insurance;65 Part C, called Medicare Advantage, is 
a plan offered by private companies that contract with Medicare to provide 
Part A and Part B benefits;66 and Part D offers prescription drug coverage 
through insurance companies or other private companies.67 Parts A and B 
are considered traditional Medicare.68 All eligible beneficiaries are 
automatically enrolled in Part A, and Part B enrollment is optional.69  
Part A finances inpatient hospital services, care in a skilled-nursing 
facility for continued treatment or rehabilitation after hospitalization, home 
health care services, and hospice care for the terminally ill.70 Under Part A, 
Medicare pays for all reasonable expenses, minus a deductible amount for 
the first 60 days, and then afterwards, a daily coinsurance payment is also 
charged.71  
Part B pays for physicians’ services and outpatient hospital services, 
including emergency room visits, ambulatory surgery, diagnostic tests, 
laboratory services, outpatient therapy, occupational-therapy, and durable 
                                                                                                                              
64 CMS is a federal agency that runs Medicare and Medicaid.  Glossary - C, 
MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/glossary/c.html (last visited July 2, 2013). 
65 John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicare, 327 NEW. ENG. J. 
MED. 1467, 1469 (1992), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~jay/health_class/Rea 
dings/Lecture03/iglehart_medicare.pdf. 
66 Medicare Advantage Plans Cover All Medicare Services, MEDICARE.GOV, 
http://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/medicare-health-plans/what-medicare-
advantage-plans-cover.html# (last visited July 2, 2013). 
67 How to Get Drug Coverage, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-
change-plans/get-drug-coverage/get-drug-coverage.html# (last visited July 2, 2013). 
68 Patricia Barry, Figuring Out Your Choices, AARP (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-04-2011/medicare-choices.html. 
69 Iglehart, supra note 65, at 1469. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
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medical equipment.72  Generally Part B does not pay for routine physical 
examinations, preventative care, or services not related to the treatment of 
illness.73 However, provisions in the ACA allow for coverage of some 
preventative care services.74 Under Part B, Medicare pays 80 percent of the 
approved amount for covered services in excess of an annual deductible.75 
B. Funding Medicare 
Medicare is funded by two trust funds: the Hospital Insurance trust fund 
and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) trust fund, both of which 
are maintained by the Department of Treasury.76 Though maintained by the 
Department of Treasury, the Social Security Act established the Medicare 
Board of Trustees to oversee the financial operations of both funds.77 The 
board is made up of members that include the Secretary of Treasury, the 
Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the 
Commissioner of Social Security.78 The Hospital Insurance trust fund, 
which itself is funded by payroll taxes from employees and employers, 
finances Medicare Part A.79 Medicare Parts B and D are funded by the SMI 




74 LANDMARK, supra note 53, at 121. 
75 Iglehart, supra note 65, at 1467, 1469. 
76 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICARE PROVISIONS IN PPACA (P.L.111-148) 13 
(2010), available at http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File 
_id=55a563ed-0be1-4715-9fd3-ad0bf6e9b2bf. 
77 THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS. AND FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. 
TRUST FUNDS, THE 2012 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE 
FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE 
TRUST FUNDS 1 (2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2012.pdf 
[hereinafter THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS.]. 
78 Id. 
79 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 76, at 13.  Each pays a tax of 1.45 percent on 
earnings. Id. Self-employed workers pay 2.9 percent of their net income. THE BDS. OF 
TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 10. 
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premiums paid by current enrollees and general revenues.80 Parts B and D 
are two separate accounts within the SMI trust fund.81 
Projections of Medicare costs are highly uncertain due to unknown 
scientific advances82 and the feasibility of cost saving measures in the 
ACA.83 Expenditures like the continuing growth in the volume and intensity 
of services provided per beneficiary, the increasing number of beneficiaries 
enrolling in Medicare, and the continuing improvements in life expectancy 
all suggest that Medicare costs will continue to increase and put financial 
stress on Medicare’s trust funds.84 
While the Hospital Insurance fund is projected to be exhausted85 by 
2024,86 the SMI Trust fund may have a brighter financial outlook.87 The 
SMI trust fund is financed by Medicare beneficiary premiums and general 
revenue.88 The Medicare Board of Trustees projects the SMI trust fund will 
remain in financial balance in the future due to premiums being set at a 
level to meet expected costs each year.89 However, the aging population and 
rising health care costs will cause the SMI fund projected costs to grow 
                                                                                                                              
80 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 76, at 13. 
81 U.S. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/history/pdf/tr09summary.pdf. 
82 THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 2–3. 
83 Id. at 46. 
84 See id. at 21–22. 
85 Medicare Hospital Insurance program is considered insolvent when revenues and trust 
fund balances will not cover 100 percent of projected costs. Paul N. Van de Water, 
Medicare Is Not “Bankrupt”: Health Reform Has Improved Program’s Financing, CTR. 
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (June 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3532. 
86 THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 27. 
87 See id. at 45. 
88 General revenues include special payments by states, fees on manufacturers, and fees 
on importers of brand-name prescription drugs. SOC. SEC. AND MED. BDS. OF TRS., A 
SUMMARY OF THE 2012 ANNUAL REPORTS (2012), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/index.html; THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., 
supra note 77, at 45. 
89 THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 45. 
Ending the "Doc Fix" 259 
VOLUME 12 • ISSUE 1 • 2013 
rapidly, from 2 percent of GDP in 2011 to 4 percent of GDP by 2087.90 
Because expenditures have exceeded the statutory target, the SGR would 
cause a 31 percent reduction in payments, which the Medicare Board’s 
projection assumes.91 As stated before, the SGR requires payments to 
providers to be reduced if expenditures exceed a statutory target in order to 
move spending back towards the target path.92 
Congress, however, prevented this decrease, as it has been doing since 
2003, and decided to keep rates unchanged until January 1, 2014.93 
Congress acting to delay or “freeze” physician payment rates creates an 
artificial projection of how much premiums will be set at in the future.94 
Because the SMI fund is projected to make up more of GDP, it suggests that 
premiums will increase in order to continue sustaining the SMI fund.95 This 
is a problem because it can lead to Medicare beneficiaries not being able to 
afford health care due to premiums being too expensive.  The fact that the 
growth projection is based on a 31 percent reduction in payment rates, but 
that rates have not been reduced that low, suggests that premiums will be 
significantly higher than anticipated. 
C. The “Un”-Sustainable Growth Rate 
One of the criticisms of Medicare is its antiquated design.96 Medicare was 
designed to look like the old “Blues” plans in that hospital inpatient care, 
                                                                                                                              
90 SOC. SEC. AND MED. BDS. OF TRS., supra note 88. 
91 THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 7. 
92 Paul N. Van de Water, The Sustainable Growth Rate Formula and Health Reform, 
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, (Apr. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3166. 
93 Mark Merlis, Health Policy Briefs: Medicare Payments to Physicians, HEALTH 
AFFAIRS (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief 
_id=83. 
94 See THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 45–46. 
95 See generally id.; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 76, at 13–14. 
96 Charles Hardin, Testimony of Charles Hardin, Council for Government Reform, 
NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE, (Sept. 8, 1998), 
available at http://rs9.loc.gov/medicare/hardintest.html; Julie Barnes, Moving Away 
From Fee-for-Service, THE ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012, 5:45 PM), 
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physician office visits, as well as surgery were covered.97 With this design 
comes the retroactive fee-for-service payment method, which rewards 
overutilization98 and does not consider the quality of care delivered.99 As 
mentioned before, when providers are paid on a fee-for-service basis, it 
means they are paid for each service performed.100 A fee-for-service 
payment method offers little incentive to discourage delivering unnecessary 
services because reimbursements are not based on quality or the impact on 
patients’ health.101 However, some providers enjoy this method of payment 
because it provides economic and clinical autonomy over the provider’s 
practice.102 Being able to establish prices for services and structure their 
clinical work at their professional discretion allows providers to exercise 
economic and clinical autonomy over their practice.103 While maintaining 
autonomy is important, billing on a fee-for-service schedule is part of what 
makes our current health care system unsustainable.104 
Providers that care for traditional Medicare beneficiaries are paid (or 
reimbursed) on a fee-for-service basis.105 Thus, the SGR affects them 





98 Overutilization is the unnecessary treatment, tests, and studies that patients undergo 
each year that leads to waste and high costs. See Martin Sipkoff, Who’s Tackling 
Rampant Overutilization? Health Plans!, MANAGED CARE, available at 
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0912/0912.utilization.html. 
99 AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REFORM: EARLY INNOVATORS SHARE WHAT 
THEY HAVE LEARNED 3 (2012), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/washington/physician-payment-reform-white-paper.pdf. 
100 HEALTHCARE.GOV, supra note 14.  
101 Barnes, supra note 96. 
102 See generally Richard A. Culbertson & Philip R. Lee, Medicare and Physician 
Autonomy, 18 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 2, 119–20 (1996), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/MedicarePhysicalAutonomy.pdf. 
103 See id. 
104 Barnes, supra note 96. 
105 See MEDPAC, supra note 28, at 91. 
106 See id.; AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 60, at 6. 
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payments for Part B services are made on the basis of a fee schedule that 
physicians bill to Medicare.107 In an effort to create a sustainable growth 
path for Part B expenditures, the Center for Medicare Services has used the 
SGR formula to calculate physician payments for providing services to 
Medicare patients.108 Created under The Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the 
SGR formula was established because of the concern that the Medicare fee 
schedule itself would not adequately constrain overall increases in spending 
for physicians’ services.109 The SGR is the statutory method for determining 
the annual updates to the Medicare physician fee schedule;110 however, it is 
not based on actual health care practices.111 The SGR is derived from four 
factors: 1) the estimated percentage of changes in physicians’ fees; 2) the 
number of fee-for-service beneficiaries; 3) the percentage growth in real 
GDP (ten year moving average) per capita; and 4) the changes in laws and 
regulations.112 Under the SGR, cumulative Medicare spending on 
physicians’ services is supposed to follow a statutory target that depends on 
the rates of growth in physicians’ costs, Medicare enrollment, and real gross 
domestic product per person.113  If spending in a given year exceeds the 
SGR target for that year, then the amounts paid to physicians for each 
service provided114 are supposed to be reduced in the following year in 
order to move total spending back towards the target path.115 
The SGR formula is problematic because it attempts to limit Medicare 
spending for physicians’ services by restraining payment rates without 
                                                                                                                              
107 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 62, at 1. 
108 AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 60, at 6; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 62, at 2. 
109 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 63, at 1. 
110 Id. 
111 AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 60, at 6. 
112 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 62, at 3. 
113 Id. See THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 35. 
114 “This is typically known as the fee-for-service model where providers are paid a 
specified amount for each service provided.” Fee-for-Service (FFS), 
HEALTHINSURANCE.INFO, http://healthinsurance.info/HIFFS.HTM (last visited July 2, 
2013). 
115 Van de Water, supra note 92. 
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limiting the growth in volume and complexity of services.116 As noted 
before, medicine and health care continues to grow in complexity with new 
innovations. In general, health care costs reflect increases in the earnings of 
health care professionals, growth in the utilization and intensity of services, 
and other medical cost inflation.117 Because the sustainable growth rate 
greatly underestimates the increase in the volume and complexity of 
doctors’ services, the formula requires more severe cuts as each year 
passes.118 
Since 2003, Congress has stepped in to prevent impending reductions.119 
Not surprisingly, this year Congress voted to freeze physician payment rates 
at the 2012 payment levels.120 However, these fixes only contribute to 
increasing the cost of Medicare because freezing payment rates does not 
account for rising health care costs, so the gap continues to grow, and the 
potential cuts get larger over time.121 The cost of implementing this year’s 
patch, or “doc fix,” is costing nearly a $25.2 billion spread over ten years.122 
As a result, doctors cannot afford to accept Medicare beneficiaries because 
they are getting paid lower rates in light of expensive costs for providing 
care. 
D. Medicare Advantage (Part C) 
As an alternative to traditional Medicare fee-for-service, Congress made 
several policy changes to encourage private plan participation in Medicare 
and enrollment growth under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 in an effort 
                                                                                                                              
116 Id. 
117 THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 41. 
118 Van de Water, supra note 92. 
119 THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 45–46. 
120 Sustainable Growth Rate, AM. ACAD. OF DERMATOLOGY, http://www.aad.org/ 
member-tools-and-benefits/practice-management-resources/health-system-reform-
resource-center/sustainable-growth-rate (last visited July 2, 2013). 
121 See Neil Waldron, Medicare Payments to Physicians and the Sustainable Growth 
Rate, ROCKY MOUNTAIN HEALTH PLANS (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.rmhp.org/blog/201 
2/12/medicare-payments-to-physicians-and-the-sustainable-growth-rate-sgr-rmhp/. 
122 Merlis, supra note 93. 
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to save more money.123 The assumption was that private plans would 
operate more efficiently than traditional Medicare.124 Medicare Advantage 
(MA) plans receive a capitated payment per beneficiary instead of a fee for 
each service, and are considered by federal policymakers as a way of 
controlling the growth of health care costs due to the greater incentive to 
innovate and use care management techniques.125 Under capitation, a 
doctor, medical group, hospital, or integrated health system, receives a 
certain flat fee for every month for taking care of an individual enrolled in a 
managed health care plan126 regardless of the cost of that individual’s 
care.127 Thus, it forces providers to efficiently use services because they are 
only allotted a certain amount to spend on a patient per month.128 Capitation 
was meant to create incentives for efficiency, cost control, and preventative 
care in health care.129 Given that the majority of individuals enrolled in a 
health plan will never use health care services within any given month, 
capitation arrangements should naturally “balance out” the high utilizers of 
                                                                                                                              
123 See LANDMARK, supra note 53, at 119. Medicare Advantage plans receive capitated 
payments from both the Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance Part B 
trust fund accounts. THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 1. 
124 Tanaz Petigara & Gerard Anderson, Payments to Medicare Advantage Plans, HEALTH 
POLICY MONITOR (2009), available at http://www.hpm.org/en/Surveys/Johns_Hopkins_ 
Bloomberg_School_of__Publ._H__USA/13/Payments_to_Medicare_Advantage_Plans.ht
ml  (origins of health policy idea). 
125 Id. See Capitation, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-
resources/practice-management-center/claims-revenue-cycle/managed-carecontracting/ 
evaluating-payment-options/capitation.page (last visited July 2, 2013). There is a fee for 
service component in some Medicare Advantage plans. Id.; THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE 
FED. HOSP. INS., supra note 77, at 311. 
126 Managed Care is any system that manages health care delivery to control costs. 
Definition of Managed Care, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medterms.com/script/ma 
in/art.asp?articlekey=4270 (last visited July 2, 2013). Typically, managed care systems 
rely on primary care physicians who acts as a gatekeeper for other services such as 
specialized medical care, surgery, and physical therapy. Id. 
127 Mark Hagland, How Does Your Doctor Get Paid?: The Controversy Over Capitation, 
PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/doctor/care/capitation.html (last 
visited July 10, 2013). 
128 See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 125. 
129 Hagland, supra note 127. 
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health care in health plans with those who use little to no health care every 
month.130 Despite the perceived benefits capitation can offer, perverse 
incentives can arise when delivering health care. For example, some 
providers may withhold care or provide less expensive care in an effort to 
save money.131 Also, depending on what the capitated payments are, 
payments may not provide enough money to fund the kinds of preventative 
services that capitation should theoretically encourage.132 This is probably 
why MA plans work for people when they are relatively well, but fall short 
of traditional Medicare when patients are sick or disabled.133 Patients with 
long-term and chronic conditions are often denied coverage for necessary 
care, or their coverage is terminated under Medicare Advantage.134 
Another issue with MA is that it costs more than traditional Medicare.135  
Currently, Medicare pays MA plans based on a bidding system under which 
payments are determined by comparing bid plans that reflect the plans’ 
estimated costs to a benchmark.136  Plans bidding below the benchmark 
receive their bid plus a rebate equal to 75 percent of the difference between 
the bid and the benchmark, and plans that bid above the benchmark receive 
the benchmark.137 However, plans that bid above the benchmark must 
require that each enrollee pay a premium equal to the difference between 
the bid and the benchmark.138 While some plans have used the excess 
money to offer drug coverage without premiums and extra benefits, such as 





133 See Jordan Rau, Research Finds Link Between Poor Health and Seniors Switching Out 
of Private Medicare Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.kaiserheal 
thnews.org/Stories/2013/February/04/Medicare-Advantage-disenrollment.aspx. 
134 See id. 
135 Hagland, supra note 127. 
136 Furrow et al., supra note 54, at 201–02. 
137 Id. at 202. 
138 Id. 
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average 113 percent of the regular Medicare rates for doctors, hospitals, and 
others.139 As a result, the ACA freezes payments to MA plans for 2011, 
causing a $132 billion dollar reduction in payments to MA plans over ten 
years.140 While this is seemingly cost effective, Medicare Advantage cuts 
could have long lasting effects by discouraging physicians from accepting 
Medicare beneficiaries. 
III. ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
TO ENCOURAGE PROVIDERS TO ACCEPT MEDICARE PATIENTS 
A. Fragmented Care vs. Coordinated Care  
A common criticism of United States health care is the fragmented nature 
of its payment and delivery system.141 This fragmentation is often due to no 
single group of participants (physician, hospitals, employers) being 
responsible for the patients’ care.142 Many physicians who practice solo or 
in groups often do not coordinate care across specialty lines or with 
inpatient facilities, which makes providing care extraordinarily 
uncoordinated and episodic.143 For example, there will often be multiple 
hospitals and health systems in the same city with no ability to 
communicate health information across systems, which perpetuates 
unnecessary duplication of services.144 Medicare beneficiaries with multiple 
chronic conditions account for 93 percent of Medicare fee-for-service 
                                                                                                                              
139 LANDMARK, supra note 53, at 119. 
140 Furrow et al., supra note 54, at 201. 
141 Donald M. Berwick, Launching Accountable Care Organizations – The Proposed 
Rule for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 16 (2011), 
available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1103602. 
142 Id. 
143 Thomas L. Greaney, Regulators as Market-Makers: Accountable Care Organizations 
and Competition Policy 3 (working paper, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2124097. 
144 See History, CAMDEN COALITION OF HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS, http://www.camden 
health.org/about/about-the-coalition/history/ (last visited July 2, 2013); Accountable Care 
Organizations (ACOs): General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., http://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/ACO/ (last visited July 2, 2013). 
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expenditures.145 Because these patients often receive care from multiple 
physicians due to their chronic condition, a failure to coordinate care can 
often lead to patients not getting the care they need and being subject to 
medical mistakes in the course of care.146 One in five Medicare patients 
discharged from the hospital is readmitted within 30 days.147 This alarming 
statistic illuminates the need for practitioners to position themselves to 
communicate treatment options with one another by having access to 
patient records and a shared financial interest in making health care work 
efficiently.148 The fee-for-service payment structure also helps perpetuate 
fragmentation because care coordination within and outside of the practice, 
as well as information exchanges, are not rewarded.149 Because 
fragmentation can lead to duplication and waste,150 ACOs will aim to 
establish groups of service providers and suppliers who work together to 
manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries.151 
Institutions and health care providers interested in forming an ACO will 
have considerable flexibility in the structure they assume because ACOs 
can be led by physicians in group practices,152 networks of individual 
practices, hospitals, or partnerships among these entities and other health 
care providers.153 However, ACOs must have an established mechanism for 
                                                                                                                              
145 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 56. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 LANDMARK, supra note 53, at 141. 
149 See GREANEY supra note 143, at 5. 
150 Berwick, supra note 141. 
151 Medicare Shared Savings Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (2010). 
152 A medical group practice is defined as three or more physicians engaged in the 
practice of medicine as a legal entity sharing business management, facilities, records, 
and personnel. Mary Pat Whaley, How Does One Become a Medical Practice Manager, 
MANAGE MY PRACTICE (Oct. 18, 2008), http://www.managemypractice.com/how-does-
one-become-a-medical-practice-manager/. This includes single and multispecialty 
physician offices, ambulatory surgery and diagnostic imaging centers, and hospital-based 
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153 See Robert Kocher, Physicians Versus Hospitals as Leaders of Accountable Care 
Organizations, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full 
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joint decision-making.154 To qualify, an ACO must agree to be accountable 
for the overall care of a group of at least 5,000 Medicare beneficiaries;155 
have sufficient participation of primary care physicians; have processes that 
promote evidence based medicine;156 report on quality costs; and be capable 
of coordinating care among primary care providers, specialists, and 
hospitals.157 
B. ACO Payment Structure 
If ACOs achieve a certain amount of savings under Medicare Parts A and 
B per beneficiary assigned to that ACO, then the ACO will qualify for an 
annual incentive bonus.158  Medicare would pay a single bundled fee per 
patient and, in turn, ACOs would share in any savings that might accrue to 
Medicare as a result of not paying for every clinic visit, test, and 
procedure.159 A bundled payment is a single payment for all services related 
to a treatment or condition that possibly spans multiple providers in 
multiple settings.160 This is similar to the capitation method in Medicare 
Advantage, but there are safeguards in place to emphasize quality of care 
                                                                                                                              
/10.1056/NEJMp1011712#t=article. 
154 Furrow et al., supra note 54, at 212. 
155 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(D) (2010) (requiring that “[a]t a 
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156 Evidence based medicine is the conscientious and judicious use of current best 
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. Evidence Based 
Medicine Definitions, NYU SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, http://library.med.nyu.edu/library/ins 
truction/handouts/pdf/ebmdefinitions.pdf (last visited July 1, 2013). The practice of 
evidence based medicine means integrating individual, clinical expertise with the best 
available external clinical evidence from systemic research. Id. 
157 Furrow et al., supra note 54, at 211; Affordable Care Act, INFORMED MEDICAL 
DECISIONS FOUNDATION, http://informedmedicaldecisions.org/shared-decision-making-
policy/federal-legislation/affordable-care-act/ (last visited July 1, 2013). 
158 Id. 
159 LANDMARK, supra note 53, at 141. 
160 ANTONIO P. LINARES, ANTHEM, ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS: OVERVIEW 
AND ACO PILOTS 3, available at http://www.himss.org/files/HIMSSorg/content/files/am 
bulatorydocs/HIMSSAccountableCareOrganization_OverviewACOPilots.pdf. 
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and discourage corner cutting or denial of care.161 The bundled payment 
will be calculated by integrating Medicare payments for hospital inpatient 
and outpatient services, physician services, emergency room services, and 
post-acute care services.162 While the bundled payment model allows 
providers to retain any amount by which the actual cost of care was below 
the bundled payment for the episode, it simultaneously requires providers to 
assume financial risk for any amount by which the actual cost of care 
exceeds the bundled payment amount for the episode.163 Medicare will, 
however, continue to pay individual providers and suppliers for specific 
items and services under the current Medicare fee-for-service payment 
system.164 
In light of this reality, CMS finalized both a one-sided model ACO and a 
two-sided model ACO.165 Under the one-sided risk model, ACOs are 
eligible to share in the savings generated through care coordination but are 
not financially responsible for losses that result when the cost of care 
exceeds the benchmark level.166 Alternatively, under the two-sided model, 
                                                                                                                              
161 See LANDMARK, supra note 53, at 131. 
162 Peter Fise, Accountable Care Organizations: 2012 Symposium Comments: Prognosis 
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS 1 (2012). available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-
Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/ACO-NarrativeMeasures-
Specs.pdf. 
165 Fise, supra note 162, at 297–98; 42 C.F.R § 425.600 (2012). This amended 42 C.F.R. 
§ 425 by adding § 425.200(b)(2) to establish that “for 2013 and all subsequent years, the 
term of the agreement is 3 years.” Id. In addition, by adding § 425.600 to require that 
during the first three-year agreement period, MSSP participating ACOs must elect to 
operate under either “Track I,” which operates under a “one-sided model” that allows 
ACOs to share in savings generated without assuming risk for losses incurred when per-
beneficiary expenditure levels exceed per-beneficiary benchmarks. Id. Alternatively, it 
could operate under “Track 2,” which requires the ACO to assume downside risk, but 
also offers ACOs a greater percentage share of savings generated. Id. New section 
425.600(c) requires that in all subsequent three-year agreement periods—following the 
first three-year agreement period—an ACO must elect to operate under “Track 2.”  Id. 
166 Fise, supra note 162, at 298. 
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ACOs must assume financial risk for a percentage of the losses that result 
when the expenditures for a given beneficiary exceed the benchmark 
level.167 The CMS-developed benchmark is based off of estimates of what 
total expenditures for Medicare fee-for-service Parts A and B would have 
been without the ACO structure, and is updated/re-evaluated every year.168 
The two-sided model is designed to incentivize providers within the ACOs 
to limit excess use of fee-for-service reimbursements.169 
To reward ACOs for sharing in the losses, the law allows participants in 
the two-sided model to earn a higher percentage of the cost savings than the 
one-sided model.170 Shared savings payments are determined by the ACOs 
aggregate quality performance score, which determines the “sharing rate” or 
percentage of shared savings the ACO is allowed to retain.171 ACOs must 
report on their performance of providing quality care based on 33 quality 
metrics established by CMS, which determines their quality performance 
score.172 The higher the score, the higher the sharing rate.173 For a one-sided 
risk model ACO, the maximum sharing rate is 50 percent, which means the 
ACO may share in a maximum of 50 percent of the savings generated 
relative to the benchmark, while a two-sided risk model ACO has a sharing 
rate of 60 percent.174 Shared savings, however, is limited to a percentage of 
the benchmark.175 A one-sided risk model ACO shared savings are capped 
                                                                                                                              
167 Id. 
168 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: 
MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM 4, available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/ 
Medicare-Fee-for-ServicePayment/sharedsavingsprogram/ 
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at 10 percent of the benchmark, and a two-sided risk model ACO shared 
savings are capped at 15 percent of the benchmark.176 
Because the two-sided risk model ACOs share in the loss if expenditures 
for a given beneficiary exceed the benchmark level, CMS established a 
“shared loss rate.”177 This rate is the percentage of actual costs in excess of 
the benchmark that must be absorbed by the ACO and is equal to one minus 
the ACO’s shared savings rate.178 For example, if a two-sided risk model 
ACO’s sharing rate is 45 percent, then its shared loss rate would be 55 
percent, which means the ACO would be financially responsible for 55 
percent of the excess costs above the benchmark, with the Medicare 
program paying for the remainder.179 However, like shared savings, shared 
losses are also capped at certain percentages of the benchmark.180 The 
maximum shared loss rate is 60 percent.181 In order to prevent shared 
savings being awarded for random variation182 in health care spending on 
Medicare beneficiaries as opposed to actual care coordination, ACOs must 
meet a minimum level of savings relative to the benchmarks before 
participating in shared savings known as the minimum savings rate.183 
C. Providing ACOs With a Platform: Repealing the Sustainable Growth 
Rate & Encouraging ACO Participation 
As it stands, the current trajectory of Medicare spending is unsustainable, 
largely due to the SGR and low reimbursement rates.184 Because the SGR 
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177 Id. at 302. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
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182 See generally MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPROVING INCENTIVES IN THE 
MEDICARE PROGRAM 49, 50 (2009), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/j 
un09_EntireReport.pdf (discussing the connection between random variation as it 
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formula is used to calculate physician payments for providing services to 
Medicare beneficiaries, providers who are reimbursed on a fee-for-service 
basis are affected by the formula.185 Low reimbursement rates affect the 
number of Medicare beneficiaries a primary care provider is able to take 
care of.186 If payment rates are too low, then providers cannot afford to take 
care of Medicare beneficiaries. In light of this reality, access to primary care 
is becoming increasingly difficult for Medicare beneficiaries to obtain. The 
current payment approach penalizes physicians who control or reduce 
volume because they are unfairly subject to payment reductions in an effort 
to align with statutory targets.187 Fee-for-service payments reward 
overutilization by encouraging clinicians to compensate for insufficient 
Medicare payments.188 Because providers get paid a fee per service, the 
impetus to bill unnecessarily for services in order to recoup costs not 
covered by Medicare’s low reimbursements is tempting. The current 
payment system perpetuates fragmentation and inefficiencies by not taking 
into account volume, complexity of services, or rewards for coordinating 
care.189 
Repealing the SGR formula would allow ACOs to become a viable 
alternative payment method to fee-for-service190 and could encourage 
providers to continue accepting Medicare beneficiaries. Given the potential 
to share in the savings along with an underlying fee-for-service payment 
structure within, ACOs could encourage providers to voluntarily opt in. 
However, failing to repeal the SGR could cause providers to reluctantly 
participate in ACOs despite the cost sharing incentive. The SGR is a 
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component in determining updates in the fee-for-service payment method. 
Because there is a fee-for-service component that underlies the ACO 
payment structure, the SGR could influence the Medicare reimbursement 
rates within the ACO fee-for-service payment structure. Because the SGR 
formula is designed to restrain payments if expenditures exceed a statutory 
target,191 the shared savings generated through cost containment efforts in 
the ACO could be off-set by the continued payment rate reductions. 
Therefore, instituting a new way to update physician payments that apply to 
the underlying fee-for-service payments within ACOs could make ACOs 
more successful in getting providers to participate.  CMS is currently 
engaged in a number of initiatives to test new health care delivery and 
payment models intended to reduce costs while improving quality.192 
Until the SGR is repealed, ACOs could act to limit the perverse 
incentives that fee-for-service has developed as well as entice providers to 
participate in ACOs. Offering an underlying fee-for-service method could 
ease providers’ concerns about not getting paid for their services under both 
a one-sided and two-sided ACO model. Additionally, economic and clinical 
autonomy that were enjoyed under a fee-for-service arrangement are 
encouraged under an ACO.  Not only can providers establish their fees, but 
the law requires that 75 percent of the ACOs’ governing body be held by 
ACO participants.193 Having this structure is important because it prevents 
insurance companies from using payment mechanisms to influence how 
providers practice.194 An ACO’s physicians decide together, with 
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information on patient utilization and guidelines on physician performance, 
how best to manage their patients.195 
Collaboration within ACOs is key to sharing in the cost savings because 
the savings amount is based on a group quality performance score.196 Unlike 
the sustainable growth rate which does not reward care coordination or 
quality, ACOs reward quality by cost sharing.197 For those providers who 
are risk averse, having the option of the one-sided model in which ACOs 
only share in the gains could ease providers’ hesitance to participate in an 
ACO. A one-sided model allows those ACOs with less experience in risk 
models to gain experience in management before sharing in the losses.198 
However, under the one-sided model there could be potential problems in 
overutilization because ACOs would not share in the losses, and thus not be 
held financially accountable for their choices.199 An underlying fee-for-
service method could frustrate the goal of containing volume because of the 
temptation to increase payments by billing per service.200 While it seems 
this same issue could arise under the two-sided model, it is less likely to 
happen because the ACO bears the responsibility of covering unnecessary 
costs.201 Although an ACO is sharing in the losses, it is subject to a higher 
savings rate, which means it is eligible to earn more money for meeting 
quality metrics. Additionally, losses are capped at a certain percentage of 
the benchmark, which can help ACOs with its risk management. 
Although financially incentivizing providers to curb costs has its benefits, 
it can have its drawbacks. Therefore, financial incentives should be used 
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with care so as not to counteract the concerns of incentives undermining 
providers’ professional ethos.202 While financial incentives typically employ 
a mode of self-interest, implementing performance rankings that are openly 
discussed within group settings can be highly effective in counteracting 
self-interest.203 Counteracting self-interest within group settings works 
because it fosters a collaborative environment where colleagues can learn 
from each other–for example, when data on variation in health outcomes or 
utilization of resources causes physicians to reexamine their care.204 
Although ACOs provide financial incentives, their structure fosters a 
collaborative environment in that the financial incentive is based off of a 
group quality performance score.205 
This type of arrangement would not only hold providers accountable for 
their care decisions, but would also be better for the patients because they 
are receiving a holistic approach to their care. Collaboration on patient 
treatment would make designing a care plan for a patient better. Providers 
would be able to understand and review the interactions that the patient has 
had with other providers and analyze which treatments have worked and 
which have not. The ability of ACO participants to work toward the 
common goal of providing care206 and to reap the financial rewards 
outweigh the payment inequities perpetuated by the sustainable growth rate, 
with respect to primary care as opposed to specialists.207 The favorable 
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payment structure within the ACO could encourage primary care providers 
to opt in and be financially capable of accepting Medicare beneficiaries. 
While some providers and suppliers prefer Medicare Advantage for a 
risk-sharing model because of its predictable income,208 cost shifting to 
Medicare beneficiaries in the form of higher premiums is still a potential 
risk in adopting this model. If the bids are above the standard benchmark, 
then each enrollee pays a premium equal to the difference between the bid 
and the benchmark;209 if payments from Medicare are too low, providers 
can make up for the lack of payment in higher premiums. The propensity to 
cost-shift in order to make up for the lack of Medicare funds can have 
detrimental effects on Medicare beneficiaries. This is particularly 
concerning in light of how access to health care for seniors may be limited 
by increases to Medicare premiums. 
The SGR also perpetuates cost-shifting in private Medicare Advantage 
Plans.210 A key factor in determining the payment rate is Medicare 
Advantage’s growth percentage, which is influenced by the sustainable 
growth rate.211 The benchmark that the Medicare Advantage plans base 
their bids off of incorporates the SGR formula.212 Because the plans are 
presumably attempting to stay under the benchmark to obtain more funding, 
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Given the perverse incentives that capitation can bring in an effort to save 
money, the sustainable growth rate reinforces this behavior because low 
payment rates encourage providers to withhold care to save money. The 
effects of the SGR are prevalent in both Medicare’s private plan and 
traditional Medicare. Repealing the SGR would encourage primary care 
providers to look to new payment methods, like ACOs, so providers can 
afford to treat Medicare beneficiaries. 
While repealing the SGR formula could counteract the impetus to cost 
shift in order to make up for low reimbursement, the perverse incentives of 
capitation still linger. Although the bundled payment method used in ACOs 
could be compared to capitation, stark differences remain.214 Unlike straight 
capitation, where individual physicians take on the financial risk, ACOs are 
taking on the risk, which again reiterates the emphasis on a collaborative 
effort to drive down costs.215 Furthermore, ACOs have quality metrics that 
could act to limit perverse incentives to withhold care in an effort to save 
money because ACOs must report and meet the quality standards to share in 
the savings.216 Sharing in the cost savings would incentivize providers and 
suppliers to work together to achieve a high quality score by identifying 
new issues for improvement. For example, an ACO model, in which an 
insurance company and medical group are working together, have reduced 
the cost of caring for 40,000 members in the California Public Employees’ 
retirement system by identifying and reducing overutilization of specific 
services (i.e. unnecessary tests or treatments) and hospital readmission 
rates.217 After a year, this kind of collaboration saved them more than $15 
million. This type of structure allows physicians to decide together how best 
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to implement guidelines and manage their patients.218 The potential for cost 
savings and collaboration among providers not only holds providers 
accountable for their care, but also could encourage primary care physicians 
to accept Medicare beneficiaries because they would not have to worry 
about the threat of low reimbursement rates from the SGR because the 
savings from the cost sharing would be given. However, if the sustainable 
growth rate could negatively affect the underlying fee-for-service payments, 
it may disincentivize providers from participating in an ACO. 
D. Moving From the SGR to ACOs: What New Problems Will There Be? 
While there is much skepticism about ACOs, probably the most 
controversial aspect of ACOs is the potential to be anticompetitive.219 Many 
health care economists fear the race to form ACOs could result in hospital 
mergers and provider consolidation.220 As hospitals position themselves to 
become integrated systems, many are working together and purchasing 
physician practices, leaving fewer independent hospitals and doctors.221 
Greater market share gives these health systems more leverage in 
negotiations with insurers, which can drive up health costs.222  Providers 
enjoying market power can use their bargaining leverage to command 
substantial increases in reimbursement from private health insurers and 
insulate themselves from the pressures to accept change in payment.223 This 
raises a number of antitrust concerns, in particular that ACOs run the risk of 
price fixing if they engage in joint price negotiations, especially in rural 
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markets.224 There is also a risk that any reduction in Medicare expenditures 
will be shifted to payors in the private sector in order to recoup costs or 
qualify for the Medicare cost-reduction bonuses.225 
While ACOs could accelerate consolidations, consolidating is already a 
powerful and pervasive trend.226 According to the consulting firm 
Accenture, 39 percent of doctors nationwide are independent, which is 
down from 57 percent in 2000.227 An array of new economic realities, from 
reduced Medicare reimbursements to higher technology costs, is driving 
consolidation in health care and transforming the practice of medicine.228 
Because the sustainable growth rate can be attributed to low reimbursement 
rates, it suggests that the sustainable growth rate is playing a part in driving 
consolidation.229 As stated before, many providers can no longer afford to 
accept Medicare beneficiaries because of the low reimbursement rate, and 
teaming up with another practice may be a way for providers to still 
continue caring for Medicare beneficiaries. 
While there are valid concerns about the potential of ACOs shifting costs 
to the private sector of health care, the low reimbursement rates suggest that 
the sustainable growth rate is also aiding in cost shifting. If payments are 
too low, providers could make up the difference by increasing prices to the 
private payers. While it is evident that the sustainable growth rate needs to 
be fixed, repealing it comes with the heavy price tag of $138 billion 
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according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).230 However, 
continuing to freeze payments and perpetuating the lack of access to 
primary care physicians for Medicare beneficiaries is going to be no less 
expensive or beneficial as time goes on.231 Currently, a bipartisan bill232 
called the Medicare Physician Payment Innovation Act of 2013 proposed to 
repeal the sustainable growth rate233 and is forcing democrats and 
republicans to work together to come up with a way to pay for the repeal.234 
The hope is that the savings generated from repealing the sustainable 
growth rate will help to offset (over time) the initial cost of repealing it.235 
Repealing the sustainable growth rate could help to decrease cost shifting to 
the private sector and may also encourage providers to remain independent. 
Many policy experts praise the shift away from independent practices 
because it makes health care less fragmented.236 Although this is true, it is 
also important to preserve independent and small group practices to avoid 
providers with too much market share controlling prices.  Implementing 
adequate guidelines and maintaining transparency through interagency 
cooperation between CMS and antitrust agencies would help curb the 
anticompetitive effects that ACOs with dominant market power may have 
on the private market.237 In conjunction with the issuance of the final 
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regulations for ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Plan, 
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission issued a joint 
statement of an antitrust enforcement policy regarding ACOs’ participation 
in the plan.238 The Final Statement addresses the criteria ACOs qualifying 
for the Shared Savings Plan must meet to be considered sufficiently 
integrated239 to engage in joint price negotiations with commercial health 
plans without being liable for violations of the Sherman Act.240 
Because the level of integration determines whether or not an ACO can 
engage in collective price negotiations,241 it is important for both the 
antitrust agencies and CMS to work together to monitor ACO behavior. In 
an effort to reduce uncertainty and encourage ACO development, the 
antitrust agencies have elected to defer to CMS on issues concerning 
clinical integration.242 While some commentators have criticized the 
agencies for ceding their responsibility for monitoring competition in 
private markets to CMS, in this instance it is appropriate given the 
uncertainty in evaluating different cases that may arise, and also to work 
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with CMS to encourage entry into ACOs.243 Although both agencies have 
different regulatory goals in that CMS is concerned with overseeing quality 
and performance of Medicare and the antitrust agencies are concerned with 
consumer protection in supervising dominant market participants,244 
working together to deter anticompetitive effects helps encourage affordable 
care for everyone, not those solely in traditional Medicare. After all, 
Medicare Advantage is a private plan that still contracts with Medicare for 
services.245 Because greater market share can drive up health costs,246 it 
would be in CMS’s interest to not enable ACOs to gain extensive market 
share because it would in turn cost more money to provide services to 
Medicare beneficiaries. Cost shifting is in no one’s best interest because it 
prevents Medicare beneficiaries from receiving access to health care. 
Therefore, CMS should be proactive in helping the antitrust agencies 
monitor complaints about an ACO’s formation or conduct. 
Because ACO participation is voluntary, it is important to ensure antitrust 
laws are not so stringent as to discourage participation in ACOs; equally 
important is monitoring large consolidations and mergers that could lead to 
unequal bargaining power. One way that the Final Statement will monitor 
consolidations is by establishing a “safety zone” for certain ACOs.247  
ACOs that fall within the safety zone are presumed to be “highly unlikely to 
raise significant competitive concerns.”248 In order to fall within the safety 
zone, multiple participants of an ACO can provide no more than 30 percent 
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of a health care service within the primary service area.249  Because an ACO 
that is outside the safety zone may be pro-competitive but also have the 
potential to have anticompetitive effects, the Final Statement describes 
certain types of conduct that an ACO should avoid to reduce the likelihood 
that it will be investigated and found to be anticompetitive.250 Additionally, 
the policy statement provides examples of conduct that may raise 
competitive concerns and advises ACOs to implement safeguards against 
conduct that may facilitate collusion among ACO participants in the sale of 
competing services outside of the ACO.251 These guidelines will hopefully 
help maintain transparency and curtail anticompetitive behavior. 
Another criticism is that ACOs have a negative assumption that “they can 
be successful without major changes in doctors’ behavior.”252 For example, 
to achieve their cost savings goals providers will need to change some of 
their approaches to treating patients through evidence-based protocols,253 
whether it be prescribing different medication or deciding whether certain 
kinds of surgery are necessary to determine optimal treatment.254 Critics go 
on to say, “[s]uch a profound behavioral shift would likely require re-
education and training and even then the result would be uncertain…ACOs 
aren’t designed or equipped to transform physician behaviors on the scale 
that will be needed.”255 While the result may be uncertain, this assumption 
is flawed because ACOs are addressing the need for behavioral changes by 
structuring themselves to allow for a quality performance score based on 
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quality metrics. Because behavioral changes in the way providers deliver 
care is likely to require training and more education, ACOs should 
implement some form of continuing education classes for providers and 
suppliers within ACOs so that they have clear expectations of how to meet 
quality metrics and also aid in fostering a collective accountable 
environment. Implicit in the quality metrics and emphasis on coordinated 
care is the positive assumption that providers must change their behavior by 
being more conscious about how they deliver care in order to share in the 
cost savings. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Though not perfect, ACOs offer promising steps toward high quality 
efficient care for Medicare beneficiaries. While the amount of money ACOs 
will actually save is debatable, studies show that integrated delivery systems 
and multi-specialty care provide more preventative services and have, on 
average, better quality indicators.256 The SGR formula is having an effect 
on payment rates, which is perpetuating concerns as to whether Medicare 
will be financially sustained once baby boomers retire and whether they will 
have access to primary care physicians. As discussed before, primary care 
physicians have a positive effect on patient outcomes and can save money 
in the long run. But in order to encourage more individuals to choose 
primary care as a career, there needs to be financial incentives. The solution 
to this problem is repealing the sustainable growth rate and adopting 
alternative payment methods, like ACOs. ACOs encourage collaboration 
and also offer financial incentives for delivering high quality care. Despite 
the potential for ACOs to be anticompetitive, the guidelines in place act to 
curb some of the worries of ACOs having too much market share. 
Furthermore, there is room for interagency collaboration between CMS and 
the antitrust agencies to monitor complaints and ACO conduct. At the end, 
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it comes down to a collaborative effort from providers, suppliers, and 
agencies to address the Medicare dilemma and ensure that the more than 80 
million projected to be on Medicare by 2030 receive high quality, efficient 
care. 
 
 
